In search of distress risk by John Y. Campbell et al.
In Search of Distress Risk
John Y. Campbell, Jens Hilscher, and Jan Szilagyi1
First draft: October 2004
This version: December 2, 2004
1Corresponding author: John Y. Campbell, Department of Economics, Littauer Center
213, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA, and NBER. Tel 617-496-6448, email
john_campbell@harvard.edu. This material is based upon work supported by the National Sci-
ence Foundation under Grant No. 0214061 to Campbell. We would like to thank Robert Jarrow and
Don van Deventer of Kamakura Risk Information Services (KRIS) for providing us with bankruptcy
data and Stuart Gilson, John Griﬃn, Scott Richardson, and seminar participants at Humboldt
Universit￿t zu Berlin, HEC Paris, and the University of Texas for helpful discussion.Abstract
This paper explores the determinants of corporate bankruptcy and the pricing
of ￿nancially distressed stocks using US data over the period 1963 to 1998. Firms
with higher leverage, lower pro￿tability, lower market capitalization, lower past stock
returns, more volatile past stock returns, and lower cash holdings are more likely
to go into bankruptcy. When predicting bankruptcy at longer horizons, market
capitalization, the most persistent predictor, becomes relatively more signi￿cant. Our
model captures much of the time variation in the US bankruptcy rate. Distressed
stocks have delivered anomalously low returns during this period. They have lower
returns but much higher standard deviations, market betas, and loadings on value
and small-cap risk factors than stocks with low bankruptcy risk. These ￿ndings are
inconsistent with the conjecture that the value and size eﬀects are compensation for
the risk of ￿nancial distress.1 Introduction
The concept of ￿nancial distress is often invoked in the asset pricing literature to
explain otherwise anomalous patterns in the cross-section of stock returns. The
idea is that certain companies have an elevated risk that they will fail to meet their
￿nancial obligations, and investors charge a premium for bearing this risk.2
While this idea has a certain plausibility, it leaves a number of basic questions
unanswered. First, how do we measure the failure to meet ￿nancial obligations?
Second, how do we measure the probability that a ￿rm will fail to meet its ￿nancial
obligations? Third, even if we have answered these questions and thereby constructed
an empirical measure of ￿nancial distress, is it the case that the stock prices of
￿nancially distressed companies move together in response to a common risk factor?
Finally, what returns have ￿nancially distressed stocks provided historically? Is there
any evidence that ￿nancial distress risk carries a premium?
In this paper we adopt a relatively atheoretical econometric approach to measure
￿nancial distress. We say that a ￿rm fails to meet ￿nancial obligations if it enters
bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. That is, we ignore the possibility
that a ￿rm may avoid bankruptcy by negotiating a debt restructuring out of court
(Gilson, John, and Lang 1990, Gilson 1997). We measure the probability of bank-
ruptcy by estimating a hazard model using a logit speci￿cation, following Shumway
(2001), Chava and Jarrow (2002), and others.
We extend the previous literature by considering a wide range of explanatory
variables, including both accounting and equity-market variables, and by explicitly
considering how the optimal speci￿cation varies with the horizon of the forecast.
Some papers on bankruptcy concentrate on predicting the event that a bankruptcy
will occur during the next month. Over such a short horizon, it should not be
surprising that the recent return on a ￿rm￿s equity is a powerful predictor, but this
may not be very useful information if it is relevant only in the extremely short run,
just as it would not be useful to predict a heart attack by observing a person dropping
2Chan and Chen (1991), for example, attribute the size premium to the prevalence of ￿marginal
￿rms￿ in small-stock portfolios, and describe marginal ￿r m sa sf o l l o w s : ￿ T h e yh a v el o s tm a r k e t
value because of poor performance, they are ineﬃcient producers, and they are likely to have high
￿nancial leverage and cash ￿ow problems. They are marginal in the sense that their prices tend to
be more sensitive to changes in the economy, and they are less likely to survive adverse economic
conditions.￿ Fama and French (1996) use the term ￿relative distress￿ in a similar fashion.
1to the ￿oor clutching his chest. We also explore time-series variation in the number
of bankruptcies, and ask how much of this variation is explained by changes over time
in the variables that predict bankruptcy at the ￿rm level.
Our empirical work begins with a bankruptcy indicator from Kamakura Risk
Information Services (KRIS), used by Chava and Jarrow (2002), which includes all
bankruptcy ￿lings in the Wall Street Journal Index, the SDC database, SEC ￿lings
and the CCH Capital Changes Reporter. The data cover the months from January
1963 until the end of 1998. We merge this dataset with ￿rm level accounting data
from COMPUSTAT as well as monthly and daily equity price data from CRSP. This
gives us about 800 bankruptcies, and predictor variables for 1.3 million ￿rm months.
We start by estimating a basic speci￿cation used by Shumway (2001) and similar
to that of Chava and Jarrow (2002). The model includes both equity market and
accounting data. From the equity market, we measure the excess stock return of each
company over the past month, the volatility of daily stock returns over the past three
months, and the market capitalization of each company. From accounting data, we
measure net income as a ratio to assets, and total leverage as a ratio to assets.
From this starting point, we make a number of contributions to the prediction of
corporate bankruptcy. First, we explore some sensible modi￿cations to the variables
listed above. Speci￿cally, we show that scaling net income and leverage by the market
value of assets rather than the book value, adding further lags of stock returns and
net income, and including dummies for missing data can improve the explanatory
power of the benchmark regression.
Second, we explore some additional variables and ￿nd that corporate cash holdings
and the market-book ratio also oﬀer a marginal improvement. In a related exercise
we construct a measure of distance to default, based on the practitioner model of
KMV (Crosbie and Bohn 2001) and ultimately on the structural bankruptcy model
of Merton (1974). We ￿nd that this measure adds relatively little explanatory power
to the reduced-form variables already included in our model.
Third, we examine what happens to our speci￿cation as we increase the horizon
at which we are trying to predict bankruptcy. Consistent with our expectations,
we ￿nd that our most persistent forecasting variable, market capitalization, becomes
relatively more important as we predict bankruptcy further into the future.
Fourth, we study time-variation in the number of bankruptcies. We compare the
2realized frequency of bankruptcy to the predicted frequency over time. Although
the model underpredicts the frequency of bankruptcy in the 1980s and overpredicts
it in the 1990s, the model ￿ts the general time pattern quite well. We show that
macroeconomic variables, in particular the default yield spread and the term spread,
can be used to capture some of the residual time variation in the bankruptcy rate.
Finally, we explore the risks and average returns on portfolios of ￿rms sorted by
our ￿tted probability of bankruptcy. We ￿nd that ￿rms with a high probability of
bankruptcy have high market betas and high loadings on the HML and SMB factors
proposed by Fama and French (1993, 1996) to capture the value and size eﬀects.
However they do not have high average returns, suggesting that the equity market
has not properly priced distress risk.
There is a large related literature that studies the prediction of corporate bank-
ruptcy. The literature varies in choice of variables to predict bankruptcy and the
methodology used to estimate the likelihood of bankruptcy. Altman (1968), Ohlson
(1980), and Zmijewski (1984) use accounting variables to estimate the probability of
bankruptcy in a static model. Altman￿s Z-score and Ohlson￿s O-score have become
popular and widely accepted measures of ￿nancial distress. They are used, for ex-
ample, by Dichev (1998), Griﬃna n dL e m m o n( 2 0 0 2 ) ,a n dF e r g u s o na n dS h o c k l e y
(2003) to explore the risks and average returns for distressed ￿rms.
Shumway (2001) estimates a hazard model at annual frequency and adds equity
market variables to the set of scaled accounting measures used in the earlier literature.
He points out that estimating the probability of bankruptcy in a static setting intro-
duces biases and overestimates the impact of the predictor variables. This is because
the static model does not take into account that a ￿rm could have had high levels
of unfavorable indicators several periods before going into bankruptcy. Hillegeist,
Cram, Keating and Lunstedt (2004) summarize equity market information by calcu-
lating the probability of bankruptcy implied by the structural Merton model. Adding
this to accounting data increases the accuracy of bankruptcy prediction within the
framework of a hazard model. Chava and Jarrow (2002) estimate hazard models at
both annual and monthly frequencies and ￿nd that the accuracy of bankruptcy pre-
diction is greater at a monthly frequency. They also compare the eﬀects of accounting
information across industries.
Duﬃe and Wang (2003) emphasize that the probability of bankruptcy depends on
the horizon one is considering. They estimate mean-reverting time series processes
for a macroeconomic state variable￿personal income growth￿and a ￿rm-speci￿c
3variable￿distance to default. They combine these with a short-horizon bankruptcy
model to ￿nd the marginal probabilities of default at diﬀerent horizons. Using
data from the US industrial machinery and instruments sector, they calculate term
structures of default probabilities. We conduct a similar exercise using a reduced-
form econometric approach; we do not model the time-series evolution of the predictor
variables but instead directly estimate longer-term default probabilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
construction of the data set, outlier analysis and summary statistics. We compare
the distributions of the predictor variables for those observations where the ￿rm went
bankrupt and all other observations. This section also considers the pattern of U.S.
corporate bankruptcies over time.
Section 3 discusses our basic hazard speci￿cation, extensions to it, and the results
from estimating the model at one-month and longer horizons. We ￿nd that past stock
return is less signi￿cant and market capitalization is more signi￿cant as the horizon
increases. This section also considers the stability of the model across industries,
￿rms with high and low leverage, and large and small ￿rms.
Section 4 considers the model￿s ￿t to the time-series pattern of bankruptices.
When including year dummies to proxy for unobserved factors aﬀecting bankruptcy
we reject the null hypothesis that our model completely explains the aggregate history
of bankruptcy in the US. Comparing the predicted and realized frequencies of
bankruptcy, however, we ￿nd that the model has considerable explanatory power for
this history.
Section 5 studies the return properties of equity portfolios formed on the ￿tted
value from our bankruptcy prediction model. We ask whether stocks with high
bankruptcy probability have unusually high or low returns relative to the predictions
of standard cross-sectional asset pricing models such as the CAPM or the three-factor
Fama-French model. Section 6 concludes.
42 Data description
In order to estimate a hazard model of bankruptcies we need a bankruptcy indicator
and a set of explanatory variables. The bankruptcy indicator we use is taken from
Chava and Jarrow (2002); it includes all bankruptcy ￿lings in the Wall Street Journal
Index, the SDC database, SEC ￿lings and the CCH Capital Changes Reporter. The
indicator is one in a month in which a ￿rm ￿led for bankruptcy under Chapter
7 or Chapter 11, and zero otherwise; in particular, the indicator is zero if the ￿rm
disappears from the dataset for some reason other than bankruptcy such as acquisition
or delisting. The data span the months from December 1963 through December 1998.
Table 1 summarizes the properties of the bankruptcy indicator. The ￿rst column
shows the number of active ￿rms for which we have data in each year; the second
column shows the number of bankruptcies; and the third column reports the percent-
age of active ￿rms that went bankrupt in each year. This series is also illustrated
in Figure 1. It is immediately apparent that bankruptcies were extremely rare until
the late 1960￿s. In fact, in the three years 1967￿1969 there were no bankruptcies at
all in our dataset. The bankruptcy rate increased in the early 1970￿s, and then rose
dramatically during the 1980￿s to a peak of 1.7% in 1986. It remained high through
the economic slowdown of the early 1990￿s, but fell in the late 1990￿s to levels only
slightly above those that prevailed in the 1970￿s.
Some of these changes through time are probably the result of changes in the
law governing corporate bankruptcy in the 1970￿s, and related ￿nancial innovations
such as the development of below-investment-grade public debt (junk bonds) in the
1980￿s and the advent of prepackaged bankruptcy ￿lings in the early 1990￿s (Tashjian,
Lease, and McConnell 1996). Changes in corporate capital structure (Bernanke and
Campbell 1988) and the riskiness of corporate activities (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu 2001) are also likely to have played a role, and one purpose of our investigation
is to quantify the time-series eﬀects of these changes.
In order to construct explanatory variables at the individual ￿rm level, we com-
bine quarterly accounting data from COMPUSTAT with monthly and daily equity
market data from CRSP. From COMPUSTAT we construct a standard measure of
pro￿tability: net income relative to total assets. Previous authors have measured
total assets at book value, but we ￿nd better explanatory power when we measure
the equity component of total assets at market value by adding the book value of
liabilities to the market value of equities. We call this series NIMTA (Net Income
5to Market-valued Total Assets) and the traditional series NITA (Net Income to Total
Assets). We also use COMPUSTAT to construct a measure of leverage: total lia-
bilities relative to total assets. We again ￿nd that a market-valued version of this
series, de￿ned as total liabilities divided by the sum of market equity and book liabil-
ities, performs better than the traditional book-valued series. We call the two series
TLMTA and TLTA, respectively. To these standard measures of pro￿tability and
leverage, we add a measure of liquidity, the ratio of a company￿s cash and short-term
assets to the market value of its assets (CASHMTA). We also calculate each ￿rm￿s
market-to-book ratio (MB).
In constructing these series we adjust the book value of assets to eliminate outliers,
following the procedure suggested by Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003). That
is, we add 10% of the diﬀerence between market and book equity to the book value
of total assets, thereby increasing book values that are extremely small, probably
mismeasured, and create outliers when used as the denominators of ￿nancial ratios.
We also winsorize all variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles of their cross-sectional
distributions. That is, we replace any observation below the 5th percentile with the
5th percentile, and any observation above the 95th percentile with the 95th percentile.
We are careful to adjust each company￿s ￿scal year to the calendar year and lag the
data by two months. This adjustment ensures that the accounting data are available
at the beginning of the month over which bankruptcy is measured. The Appendix
to this paper describes the construction of these variables in greater detail.
We add several market-based variables to these two accounting variables. We
calculate the monthly log excess return on each ￿rm￿s equity relative to the S&P 500
index (EXRET), the standard deviation of each ￿rm￿s daily stock return over the past
t h r e em o n t h s( S I G M A ) ,a n dt h er e l a t i v es i z eo fe a c h￿rm measured as the log ratio
of its market capitalization to that of the S&P 500 index (RSIZE). In addition, we
obtain historical yields on 6-month Treasury bills and 10-year Treasury bonds from
the Federal Reserve Board, and historical yields on AAA and BAA rated corporate
bonds from Amit Goyal￿s website.3
Finally, we group all ￿rms into four broad sectors using single-digit SIC codes.
Industry 1 is miscellaneous (codes 1, 3, 6, 7, 9), industry 2 is manufacturing and
minerals (codes 2, 4), industry 3 is transportation, communication and utilities (code
5), and industry 4 is ￿nance, insurance and real estate (code 8).
3The Federal Reserve data are at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm and the
corporate bond data are at http://www.bus.emory.edu/AGoyal/.
62.1 Summary statistics
Table 2 summarizes the properties of our seven main explanatory variables. The ￿rst
panel in Table 2 describes non-bankruptcy months and the second panel describes a
much smaller sample of bankruptcy months. We exclude months where any of the
seven variables have missing values, leaving us with a sample of 1,281,426 observa-
tions containing 796 bankruptcy events. We also illustrate the data in a series of
graphs. Figures 2 through 8 each have two panels, one showing the distribution of an
explanatory variable in non-bankruptcy months, the other showing the distribution
in the much smaller sample of bankruptcy months.
In interpreting these distributions, it is important to keep in mind that we weight
every ￿rm-month equally. This has two important consequences. First, the distri-
butions are dominated by the behavior of relatively small companies; value-weighted
distributions look quite diﬀerent. Second, the distributions re￿ect the in￿uence of
both cross-sectional and time-series variation. The cross-sectional averages of several
variables, in particular NIMTA, TLMTA, and SIGMA, have experienced signi￿cant
trends since 1963: SIGMA and TLMTA have trended up, while NIMTA has trended
down. The downward trend in NIMTA is not just a consequence of the buoyant
stock market of the 1990￿s, because book-based net income, NITA, displays a similar
trend. The in￿uence of these trends is magni￿e db yt h eg r o w t hi nt h en u m b e ro f
companies over time, which means that recent years have greater in￿uence on the
distribution than earlier years.
These facts help to explain several features of Table 2. The mean level of NIMTA,
for example, is only 0.002 or 0.2% per quarter in our dataset, 0.8% at an annual rate.
This is three times lower than the median level of NIMTA because the distribution of
NIMTA is negatively skewed; it is also lower than the average level of NITA because
t h em a r k e tv a l u eo fe q u i t yi so na v e r a g ea b o u tt w i c et h eb o o kv a l u ei no u rd a t a .
Nonetheless these measures of pro￿tability are all strikingly low, re￿ecting the preva-
lence of small, unpro￿table listed companies in recent years.4 The distribution of
NIMTA shown in Figure 2 has a large spike just above zero, a phenomenon noted by
Hayn (1995), suggesting that ￿rms may be managing their earnings to avoid reporting
losses.5
4The value-weighted mean of NIMTA is three times the equal-weighted mean, re￿ecting the
greater pro￿tability of large companies.
5There is a debate in the accounting literature about the interpretation of this spike. Burgstahler
and Dichev (1997) argue that it re￿ects earnings management, but Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna
7The average value of EXRET is -0.012 or -1.2% per month. This extremely low
number re￿ects both the underperformance of small stocks during the later part of
our sample period (the value-weighted mean is almost exactly zero), and the fact
that we are reporting a geometric average excess return rather than an arithmetic
average. The diﬀerence is substantial because individual stock returns are extremely
volatile. The average value of the annualized ￿rm-level volatility SIGMA is greater
than 50%, again re￿ecting the strong in￿uence of small ￿rms and recent years in which
idiosyncratic volatility has been high (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu 2001).
A comparison of the top and bottom panels of Table 2, and inspection of Figures
2￿8, reveal that bankrupt ￿rms have intuitive diﬀerences from the rest of the sample.
In months immediately preceding a bankruptcy ￿ling, ￿rms typically make losses (the
mean loss is 3.5% quarterly or 14% of market value of assets at an annual rate, and
t h em e d i a nl o s si s4 . 7 %q u a r t e r l yo ra l m o s t1 9 %a ta na n n u a lr a t e ) ;t h ev a l u eo ft h e i r
debts is extremely high relative to their assets (average leverage exceeds 75%, and
median leverage exceeds 85%); they have experienced extremely negative returns over
the past month (the mean is -132% at an annual rate or -11% over a month, while
the median is -208% at an annual rate or -17% over a month); and their volatility
is extraordinarily high (the mean is 99% and the median is 121%). Bankrupt ￿rms
also tend to be relatively small (almost 8 times smaller than other ￿rms on average,
and almost 12 times smaller at the median), and they have only about half as much
cash and short-term investments, in relation to the market value of assets, as non-
bankrupt ￿rms. Finally, the market-book ratio of bankrupt ￿rms has a similar
mean but a much higher standard deviationt h a nt h em a r k e t - b o o kr a t i oo fo t h e r
￿rms. Figure 8 shows that almost 40% of ￿rms have market-book ratios at the lower
winsorization point, while 25% have market-book ratios at the upper winsorization
point. It appears that some ￿rms go bankrupt after realized losses have driven down
their book values relative to market values, while others go bankrupt after bad news
about future prospects has driven down their market values relative to book values.
(2003) point out that discretionary accruals are not associated with the spike in the manner that
would be expected if this interpretation is correct.
83 Estimating a hazard model for bankruptcy
The summary statistics in Table 2 show that bankrupt ￿r m sh a v ean u m b e ro fu n u s u a l
characteristics. However the number of bankruptcy months is tiny compared to the
number of other months, so it is not at all clear how useful these variables are in
predicting bankruptcy. Also, these characteristics are correlated with one another
and we would like to know how to weight them optimally. Following Shumway (2001)
and Chava and Jarrow (2002), we now estimate the probability of bankruptcy over
the next period using a logit model.
We assume that the marginal probability of bankruptcy over the next period
follows a logistic distribution and is given by
Pt−1 (Yit =1 )=
1
1+e x p( −α − βxi,t−1)
(1)
where Yit is a bankruptcy indicator that is equal to one if the ￿rm goes bankrupt in
month t,a n dxi,t−1 i sav e c t o ro fe x p l a n a t o r yv a r i a b l e sk n o w na tt h ee n do ft h ep r e v i -
ous month. A higher level of α+βxi,t−1 implies a higher probability of bankruptcy.
Table 3 reports logit regression results for various alternative speci￿cations. In
column 1 we follow Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2002), and estimate
am o d e lw i t h￿ve standard variables: NITA, TLTA, EXRET, SIGMA, and RSIZE.
This model measures assets in the conventional way, using annual book values from
COMPUSTAT. It excludes ￿rm age, a variable which Shumway (2001) considered
but found to be insigni￿cant in predicting bankruptcy.
All ￿ve of the included variables in column 1 enter signi￿cantly and with the
expected sign. To get some idea of the relative impact of changes in the diﬀerent
variables we compute the eﬀect on the score of a one-standard-deviation change in
each predictor variable. This eﬀect is 0.29 for NITA, 0.96 for TLTA, 0.39 for EXRET,
0.36 for RSIZE, and 0.91 for SIGMA. Thus movements in leverage and volatility are
more important for explaining bankruptcy than movements in pro￿tability, past stock
returns, and ￿rm size.
In column 2 we replace the traditional accounting ratios NITA and TLTA that use
the book value of assets, with our ratios NIMTA and TLMTA that use the market
value of assets. These measures are more sensitive to new information about ￿rm
prospects since equity values are measured using monthly market data rather than
9quarterly accounting data. Column 2 appears to be an improved speci￿cation in
several respects. The coeﬃcient on pro￿tability more than doubles and increases
its statistical signi￿cance, and the pseudo R2,am e a s u r eo f￿tf o rt h el o g i tm o d e l ,
increases by 0.005. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient on RSIZE becomes small and statis-
tically insigni￿cant, suggesting that its role in column 1 was an artifact of our use of
accounting data.
Column 2 has 5% more observations than column 1, because we no longer need
to measure book values of assets in the COMPUSTAT dataset. Importantly, the
number of bankruptcies increases by 3% from 737 to 762. Since bankruptcies are rare
events, it is important to include as many of them as we possibly can. Accordingly
in column 3 we expand the dataset further by relaxing the requirement that we be
able to measure equity market volatility, SIGMA, over the past three months. In
cases where this variable is missing, we create a dummy variable SIGMAMISS and
enter it in the column 3 regression. This increases the number of observations by
another 1% and the number of bankruptcies by another 4% to 796. As one would
expect from these statistics, the dummy variable enters signi￿cantly as a bankruptcy
predictor. Firms with intermittent equity trading over the past three months are
more likely to fail our test for valid construction of equity volatility, and are also more
likely to go bankrupt. The magnitude of the SIGMAMISS coeﬃcient implies that
missing volatility is equivalent to volatility about 1.5 standard deviations above the
cross-sectional mean.
S of a rw eh a v eu s e do n l yt h ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h em o s tr e c e n tv a l u e so fp r o ￿tability,
leverage, excess returns, and volatility. An obvious question is whether lagged values
have some additional explanatory power. One might expect that a long history of
losses or a sustained decline in stock market value would be a better predictor of
bankruptcy than one large quarterly loss or a sudden stock price decline in a single
month. Exploratory regressions with lagged values con￿rm that lags of NIMTA and
EXRET enter signi￿cantly, while lags of the other variables do not. As a reasonable
summary, we impose geometrically declining weights on these lags. We construct
NIMTAAV Gt−1,t−12 =
1 − φ
3
1 − φ
12
¡
NIMTAt−1,t−3 + ... + φ
9NIMTAt−9,t−12
¢
,(2)
EXRETAVGt−1,t−12 =
1 − φ
1 − φ
12(EXRETt−1 + ... + φ
11EXRETt−12), (3)
10where the coeﬃcient φ =2 −1
3, implying that the weight is halved each quarter. The
data suggest that this parsimonious speci￿cation captures almost all the predictabil-
ity obtainable from lagged pro￿tability and stock returns. Column 4 of Table 3
reports the regression results using this speci￿cation, ￿nding an improvement in the
explanatory power of stock returns. This speci￿cation causes a further decline in the
importance of market capitalization, whose coeﬃcient actually changes sign.
In column 5 we add two other variables that might be relevant for bankruptcy
prediction. The ratio of cash and short-term investments to the market value of
total assets, CASHMTA, captures the liquidity of the ￿rm. A ￿rm with a high
CASHMTA ratio has liquid assets available to make interest payments, and thus
may be able to postpone bankruptcy with the possibility of avoiding it altogether if
circumstances improve. The market to book ratio, MB, captures the relative value
placed on the ￿rm￿s equity by stockholders and by accountants. Our pro￿tability
and leverage ratios use market value; if book value is also relevant, then MB may
enter the regression as a correction factor, increasing the probability of bankruptcy
when market value is unusually high relative to book value.6 Column 5 supports
both these hypotheses.
Finally, in column 6 we compare our reduced-form model with the structural
approach of KMV (Crosbie and Bohn 2001), based on the structural bankruptcy
model of Merton (1974). We construct ￿distance to default￿, DD, applying a standard
formula given in the Appendix. This formula requires an estimate of the volatility
of the ￿rm￿s asset value, and we make the assumption that asset volatility equals
equity volatility. For ￿rms with relatively safe debt, this assumption will understate
the distance to default. Although our DD measure does predict default with the
theoretically expected sign in a univariate logit regression, its explanatory power
is much lower than our reduced-form approach (the pseudo R2 is only about 8%).
Column 6 shows that DD adds relatively little explanatory power to the reduced-
form variables already included in our model, and in fact enters our multivariate
regression with the wrong sign.
6Chacko, Hecht, and Hilscher (2004) discuss the measurement of credit risk when the market-to-
book ratio is in￿uenced both by cash ￿ow expectations and discount rates.
113.1 Forecasting bankruptcy at long horizons
At the one month horizon our best speci￿cation captures about 30% of the variation in
bankruptcy risk. We now ask what happens as we try to predict bankruptcies further
into the future. In Table 4 we estimate the conditional probability of bankruptcy
in six months, one, two and three years. We again assume a logit speci￿cation but
allow the coeﬃcients on the variables to vary over time. In particular we assume
that the probability of bankruptcy in j months, conditional on survival in the dataset
for j − 1 months, is given by
Pt−1 (Yi,t−1+j =1| Yi,t−2+j =0 )=
1
1+e x p
¡
−αj − βjxi,t−1
¢. (4)
Note that this assumption does not imply a cumulative probability of bankruptcy
that is logit. If the probability of bankruptcy in j months did not change with the
horizon j,t h a ti si fαj = α and βj = β,a n di f￿rms exited the dataset only through
bankruptcy, then the cumulative probability of bankruptcy over the next j periods
would be given by 1 − (exp(−α − βxi)/(1 + exp(−α − βxi))j, which no longer has
the logit form. Variation in the parameters with the horizon j,a n de x i tf r o mt h e
dataset through mergers and acquisitions, only make this problem worse. In principle
we could compute the cumulative probability of bankruptcy by estimating models for
each horizon j and integrating appropriately; or by using our one-period model and
making auxiliary assumptions about the time-series evolution of the predictor vari-
ables in the manner of Duﬃe and Wang (2003). We do not pursue these possibilities
here, concentrating instead on the conditional probabilities of default at particular
dates in the future.
As the horizon increases in Table 4, the coeﬃcients, signi￿cance levels, and overall
￿t of the logit regression decline as one would expect. Even at three years, however,
almost all the variables remain statistically signi￿cant. The distance to default
DD enters the regression with the theoretically expected negative sign at horizons
of two and three years, but it is statistically insigni￿cant; this result is particularly
disappointing since DD is designed to measure bankruptcy risk at a medium-term
horizon of one year.
Two predictor variables are particularly important at long horizons. The coef-
￿cient on the market-to-book ratio MB is remarkably stable, and the coeﬃcient on
relative size RSIZE becomes increasingly signi￿cant with the expected negative sign
12as the horizon increases. These results imply that the most persistent attributes
of a ￿rm, its market capitalization and market-to-book ratio, become increasingly
important measures of ￿nancial distress at long horizons.
In the top panel of Table 4 the number of observations and number of bankruptcies
vary with the horizon, because increasing the horizon forces us to drop observations
at both the beginning and end of the dataset. Bankruptcies that occur within the
￿rst j months of the sample cannot be related to the condition of the ￿rm j months
previously, and the last j months of the sample cannot be used to predict bankruptcies
that may occur after the end of the sample. Also, many ￿rms exit the dataset for
other reasons between dates t − 1 and t − 1+j. In the bottom panel of Table 4 we
study a subset of ￿rms for which data are available at all the diﬀerent horizons. This
allows us to compare R2 statistics directly across horizons. We obtain very similar
results to those in the top panel, suggesting that variation in the available data is not
responsible for our ￿ndings.
3.2 Robustness checks
We have explored industry eﬀects on the bankruptcy models estimated in Tables 3
and 4. The Shumway (2001) and Chava-Jarrow (2002) speci￿cation in column 1
of Table 3 appears to behave somewhat diﬀerently in the ￿nance, insurance, and
real estate (FIRE) sector. That sector has a lower intercept and a more negative
coeﬃcient on pro￿tability. However there is no clear evidence of sector eﬀects in the
market-based speci￿cations estimated in the other columns of Table 3.
We have also used market capitalization and leverage as interaction variables, to
test the hypotheses that other explanatory variables enter diﬀerently for small or
highly indebted ￿rms than for other ￿rms. We have found no clear evidence that
such interactions are important.
134 Matching the time series of bankruptcies
As we noted earlier, there is dramatic variation in the bankruptcy rate over time.
Figure 1 shows the bankruptcy rate rising from an average of 0.3% in the 1960￿s and
1970￿s to almost 1.7% in 1986. In this section, we ask how well our model ￿ts this
pattern. We ￿rst calculate the ￿tted probability of bankruptcy for each company
in our dataset using the coeﬃcients from the best ￿tting regression in Table 3. We
then average over all the predicted probabilities for active companies in each month
to obtain a prediction of the aggregate bankruptcy rate.
Figure 9 shows annual averages of predicted and realized bankruptcies. Our
model captures much of the broad variation in bankruptcy over time, including the
strong and long-lasting increase in the 1980￿s and cyclical spikes in the mid-1970￿s
and early 1990￿s. However it somewhat overpredicts these spikes and rises in the
1980￿s much more slowly than actual bankruptcies. In the worst performing year
of 1986, the model underestimates the bankruptcy rate by about one half. Also,
the model tends to predict more bankruptcies than actually occurred throughout the
1990￿s.
As an alternative way to understand the time-series variation that is not captured
by our basic model, we augment that model by including year dummies that shift
the baseline probability of bankruptcy from one year to the next. We restrict our
attention to the period since 1975 because of the rarity of bankruptcies in earlier
years.
Figures 10 and 11 plot the demeaned year dummies estimated from a model with
only these dummies (Figure 10) and a model that also includes our standard set of
explanatory variables (Figure 11). We overwhelmingly reject the hypothesis that
the year dummies are all equal￿that is, that time eﬀects can be omitted from the
model￿although the Wald statistic for this test does fall from 172 in Figure 10 to
129 in Figure 11, implying that our model captures some of the time-variation in
bankruptcies.
To show which years have anomalous variation in bankruptcies, Figures 10 and
11 also plot a two-standard-deviation con￿dence interval for each demeaned year
dummy, constructed under the null hypothesis that all year dummies are equal. The
con￿dence interval is signi￿cantly narrower in later years because the number of ￿rm-
level observations increases over time. The model with only year dummies has a
14standard deviation of 0.63 for the dummies and displays unusually high bankruptcy
risk throughout the 1980￿s and early 1990￿s, whereas the model that uses ￿rm-level
market and accounting data has a smaller standard deviation of 0.45 and relies on
variation in the year dummies primarily in the early 1980￿s and the late 1990￿s. It is
possible that positive year dummies in the early 1980￿s re￿ect the creation of the junk
bond market in that period, and that negative year dummies in the late 1990￿s re￿ect
the increased tendency of ￿rms to restructure their debt without entering bankruptcy.
4.1 Macroeconomic eﬀects
One interpretation of time eﬀects is that they result from changes in the state of
the macroeconomy. Duﬃe and Wang (2003), for example, give an important role to
the growth rate of industrial production in their multi-period bankruptcy model. In
order to explore macroeconomic eﬀects, we ￿rst added NBER recession dummies to
our best ￿tting model for the period since 1976, both in levels and interacted with the
other coeﬃcients to allow a regime change in bankruptcy risk during a recession. We
used both contemporaneous and six-month lagged dummies to capture the possibility
that bankruptcies respond to macroeconomic conditions with a lag. However none
of these variables entered the model signi￿cantly.
We obtain more promising results when we allow for an eﬀect of interest rates on
bankruptcy risk. We measure the default yield spread between BAA and AAA rated
debt, DFY, and the term spread between 10-year Treasury bonds and six-month
Treasury bills, TMS. If we add these variables directly to the regression, without
interactions, they enter signi￿cantly. If we allow them to interact with the other
variables in the model, the interactions of DFY with relative size and leverage are
signi￿cant and drive out the direct eﬀect of DFY, while the interaction of TMS with
leverage is signi￿cant and again drives out the direct eﬀect of TMS.
Table 5 reports the results. Column 1 shows that an increase in the default yield
spread reduces bankruptcy risk for highly leveraged ￿rms and increases it for small
￿rms. This is consistent with the view that a high default yield spread is a signal of
a credit crunch, which tends to dry up credit to small ￿rms and increase the average
quality of ￿rms that do receive credit. Column 2 shows that an increase in the slope
of the yield curve reduces bankruptcy risk for highly leveraged ￿rms. Since the yield
spread usually rises when short-term interest rates fall, this may re￿ect relief to highly
indebted ￿rms with ￿oating-rate debt when short rates decline.
15The default yield spread is particularly successful at reducing the importance of
time dummies in our model. When we include only DFY interacted with relative size
and leverage, and not the level of DFY, the Wald test statistic for the signi￿cance of
the time dummies falls to 66 even though the regression includes no pure time-series
variables.
5 Risks and average returns on distressed stocks
We now turn our attention to the asset pricing implications of our bankruptcy model.
Recent work on the distress premium has tended to use either traditional risk indices
such as the Altman Z-score or Ohlson O-score (Dichev 1998, Griﬃna n dL e m m o n
2002, Ferguson and Shockley 2003) or the distance to default measure of KMV (Vas-
salou and Xing 2004). To the extent that our reduced-form model more accurately
measures the risk of bankruptcy at short and long horizons, we can more accurately
measure the premium that investors receive for holding distressed stocks.
Before presenting the results, we ask what results we should expect to ￿nd. On the
one hand, if investors accurately perceive the risk of bankruptcy they may demand
a premium for bearing it. The frequency of bankruptcy shows strong variation
over time, as illustrated in Figure 1; even if much of this time-variation is explained
by time-variation in our ￿rm-level predictive variables, it still generates common
movement in stock returns that might command a premium.
Of course, a risk can be pervasive and still be unpriced. If the standard imple-
mentation of the CAPM is exactly correct, for example, then each ￿rm￿s risk is fully
captured by its covariation with the market portfolio of equities, and bankruptcy risk
is unpriced to the extent that it is uncorrelated with that portfolio. However it seems
plausible that bankruptcies may be correlated with declines in unmeasured compo-
nents of wealth such as human capital (Fama and French 1996) or debt securities
(Ferguson and Shockley 2003), in which case bankruptcy risk will carry a positive
risk premium.7 This expectation is consistent with the high bankruptcy risk of small
7Fama and French (1996) state the idea particularly clearly: ￿Why is relative distress a state
variable of special hedging concern to investors? One possible explanation is linked to human
capital, an important asset for most investors. Consider an investor with specialized human capital
tied to a growth ￿rm (or industry or technology). A negative shock to the ￿rm￿s prospects probably
does not reduce the value of the investor￿s human capital; it may just mean that employment in the
16￿rms that have depressed market values, since small value stocks are well known to
deliver high average returns.
An alternative possibility is that investors fail to understand the relation between
our predictive variables and bankruptcy risk, and so do not discount the prices of
high-risk stocks enough to oﬀset their bankruptcy probability. This investor failure
could be consistent with rational learning through the sample period after the increase
in bankruptcies during the 1970￿s, or it could be a deeper failure of the sort postulated
by behavioral ￿nance. In either case we will ￿nd that bankruptcy risk appears to
command a negative risk premium during our sample period. This expectation is
consistent with the high bankruptcy risk of volatile stocks, since Ang, Hodrick, Xing,
and Zhang (2004) have recently found negative average returns for stocks with high
idiosyncratic volatility.
We measure the premium for ￿nancial distress by sorting stocks according to
their bankruptcy probabilities, estimated using the 12-month-ahead model of Table
4. Each January from 1976 through 1998, we form ten equally weighted portfolios
of stocks that fall in diﬀerent regions of the bankruptcy risk distribution. We hold
these portfolios for a year, allowing the weights to drift with returns within the
year rather than rebalancing monthly, in order to minimize turnover costs and the
eﬀects of bid-ask bounce.8 Our portfolios contain stocks in percentiles 0￿5, 5￿10,
10￿20, 20￿40, 40￿60, 60￿80, 80￿90, 90￿95, 95￿99, and 99￿100 of the bankruptcy risk
distribution. This portfolio construction procedure pays greater attention to the
tails of the distribution, where the distress premium is likely to be more relevant, and
particularly to the most distressed ￿rms.
Because we are studying the returns to distressed stocks, it is important to handle
carefully the returns to stocks that are delisted and thus disappear from the CRSP
database. In many cases CRSP reports a delisting return for the ￿nal month of
the ￿rm￿s life; we have 8,243 such delisting returns in our sample and we use them
￿rm will grow less rapidly. In contrast, a negative shock to a distressed ￿rm more likely implies a
negative shock to the value of human capital since employment in the ￿rm is more likely to contract.
Thus, workers with specialized human capital in distressed ￿rms have an incentive to avoid holding
their ￿rms￿ stocks. If variation in distress is correlated across ￿rms, workers in distressed ￿rms
have an incentive to avoid the stocks of all distressed ￿rms. The result can be a state-variable risk
premium in the expected returns of distressed stocks.￿ (p.77).
8In the ￿rst version of this paper we calculated returns on portfolios rebalanced monthly, and
obtained similar results to those reported here.
17where they are available. Otherwise, we use the last available full-month return in
CRSP. In some cases this eﬀectively assumes that our portfolios sell distressed stocks
at the end of the month before delisting, which imparts an upward bias to the returns
on distressed-stock portfolios (Shumway 1997, Shumway and Warther 1999).9 We
assume that the proceeds from sales of delisted stocks are reinvested in each portfolio
in proportion to the weights of the remaining stocks in the portfolio. In a few cases,
stocks are delisted and then re-enter the database, but we do not include these stocks
i nt h es a m p l ea f t e rt h e￿r s td e l i s t i n g . W et r e a t￿rms that enter bankruptcy as
equivalent to delisted ￿rms, even if CRSP continues to report returns for these ￿rms.
That is, our portfolios sell stocks of companies that enter bankruptcy and we use the
latest available CRSP data to calculate a ￿n a lr e t u r no ns u c hs t o c k s .
Table 6 reports the results. Each portfolio corresponds to one column of the
table. The top panel reports average monthly returns in excess of the market, with
t statistics below in parentheses, and then alphas with respect to the CAPM, the
three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and a four-factor model proposed by
Carhart (1997) that also includes a momentum factor. The bottom panel reports
estimated factor loadings for excess returns on the three Fama-French factors, again
with t statistics, and the standard deviation of each portfolio￿s excess return. Figures
12 and 13 graphically summarize the behavior of factor loadings and alphas.
The average returns in the ￿rst row of Table 6 are monotonically declining in
bankruptcy risk, with a spread of 1.0% per month between the lowest-risk and highest-
risk portfolios. The excess returns for low-risk portfolios are signi￿cantly positive,
but those for high-risk portfolios are statistically insigni￿cant because of their high
volatility. While the low-risk portfolios have monthly standard deviations between
2.0 and 2.5%, the highest-risk portfolio has a standard deviation of 11.2% and the
next portfolio has a standard deviation of 7.0%.
There is striking variation in factor loadings across the portfolios in Table 6. The
low-risk portfolios have negative market betas for their excess returns (that is, betas
less than one for their raw returns), and small or negative loadings on the value factor
HML. The high-risk portfolios have positive market betas for their excess returns, and
loadings greater than one on HML. Because the portfolios are equally weighted, they
all have high loadings on the size factor SMB, but the loadings increase dramatically
with bankruptcy risk. This re￿ects the role of market capitalization in predicting
9In the ￿rst version of this paper we did not use CRSP delisting returns. The portfolio results
were similar to those reported here.
18bankruptcies at medium and long horizons.
These factor loadings imply that when we correct for risk using either the CAPM
or the Fama-French three-factor model, we worsen the anomalous poor performance
of distressed stocks rather than correcting it. The spread in CAPM alphas between
the lowest-risk and highest-risk portfolios is 1.2% per month, and the spread in Fama-
French alphas is 1.8% per month. The poor performance of distressed stocks, and
not just the good performance of relatively safe stocks, is statistically signi￿cant when
we use the Fama-French model.
One of the variables that predicts bankruptcy in our model is recent past return.
This suggests that distressed stocks have negative momentum, which might explain
their low average returns. To control for this, Table 6 also reports alphas from the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model including a momentum factor. The negative alphas
for distressed stocks improve slightly, but remain statistically signi￿cant.
Overall, these results are discouraging for the view that distress risk is positively
priced in the US stock market. We ￿nd that stocks with a high risk of bankruptcy
have low average returns, despite their high loadings on small-cap and value risk
factors.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature on ￿nancial distress. First,
we carefully implement a reduced-form econometric model to predict bankruptcy at
short and long horizons. Our best model has greater explanatory power than the
existing state-of-the-art models estimated by Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow
(2002), and includes additional variables with sensible economic motivation. We be-
lieve that models of the sort estimated here have meaningful empirical advantages over
the bankruptcy risk scores proposed by Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980). While
Altman￿s Z-score and Ohlson￿s O-score were seminal early contributions, better mea-
sures of bankruptcy risk are available today. We have also presented evidence that
bankruptcy risk cannot be adequately summarized by a measure of distance to de-
fault inspired by Merton￿s (1974) pioneering structural model of bankruptcy. While
our distance to default measure is not exactly the same as those used by Crosbie and
Bohn (2001) and Vassalou and Xing (2004), we believe that this result will be robust
19to alternative measures of distance to default.
Second, we show that stocks with a high risk of bankruptcy tend to deliver anom-
alously low average returns. We sort stocks by our 12-month-ahead estimate of
bankruptcy risk. Distressed portfolios, containing stocks with high estimated bank-
ruptcy risk, have low average returns but high standard deviations, market betas,
and loadings on Fama and French￿s (1993) small-cap and value risk factors. Thus,
from the perspective of any of the leading empirical asset pricing models, these stocks
have negative alphas. This result is a signi￿cant challenge to the conjecture that
t h ev a l u ea n ds i z ee ﬀects are proxies for a distress premium. More generally, it is a
challenge to standard models of rational asset pricing in which the structure of the
economy is stable and well understood by investors.
This version of our paper is preliminary, and we plan to expand our empirical
investigation in several directions. One particularly important question is whether
the determinants of bankruptcy risk are stable over time. Our best model has a good
in-sample ￿t, but we would like to show that it predicts bankruptcy when estimated
using only data available up to each point of time. Rolling estimates of the model
will also allow us to construct portfolios of distressed stocks using contemporaneously
available information about the determinants of bankruptcy.
It should be possible to re￿ne our understanding of the bankruptcy risk anomaly
by sorting stocks on other characteristics. Our results are consistent with the ￿nd-
ings of Dichev (1998), who uses Altman￿s Z-score and Ohlson￿s O-score to measure
￿nancial distress. Vassalou and Xing (2004) use distance to default as an alternative
distress measure; they ￿nd some evidence that distressed stocks have higher returns,
but this evidence comes entirely from small value stocks. Griﬃn and Lemmon (2002),
using O-score to measure distress, show that distressed growth stocks have particu-
larly low returns. This literature suggests that it will be fruitful to sort stocks on size
and book-market ratio as well as bankruptcy risk, in order to identify which types of
distressed stocks have positive or negative abnormal returns.
One possible explanation of the bankruptcy risk anomaly is that it results from
the preferences of institutional investors, together with a shift of assets from indi-
viduals to institutions during our sample period. Kovtunenko and Sosner (2003)
have documented that institutions prefer to hold pro￿table stocks, and that this pref-
erence helped institutional performance during the 1980￿s and 1990￿s because prof-
itable stocks outperformed the market. It is possible that the strong performance
of pro￿table stocks in this period was endogenous, the result of increasing demand
20for these stocks by institutions. If institutions more generally prefer stocks with low
bankruptcy risk, and tend to sell stocks that enter ￿nancial distress, then a similar
mechanism could drive our results. This hypothesis can be tested by relating the per-
formance of distressed stocks over time to the changing institutional share of equity
ownership.
21Appendix
In this appendix we discuss issues related to the construction of our dataset. All
variables are constructed using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data. Relative size, excess
return, and accounting ratios are de￿ned as follows:
RSIZEi,t =l o g
￿
Firm Market Equityi,t
Total S&P500 Market Valuet
¶
EXRETi,t =l o g ( 1 + Ri,t) − log(1 + RS&P500,t)
NITAi,t =
Net Incomei,t
Total Assets(adjusted)i,t
TLTA i,t =
Total Liabilitiesi,t
Total Assets(adjusted)i,t
NIMTAi,t =
Net Incomei,t
(Firm Market Equityi,t + Total Liabilities i,t)
TLMTA i,t =
Total Liabilities i,t
(Firm Market Equityi,t + Total Liabilities i,t)
CASHMTAi,t =
Cash and Short Term Investmentsi,t
Total Assets(adjusted)i,t
The COMPUSTAT data items used are total assets Data6, net income Data172,
and total liabilities Data181.
To deal with outliers in the data, we correct both NITA and TLTA using the
diﬀerence between book equity (BE) and market equity (ME) to adjust the value of
total assets:
Total Assets(adjusted)i,t = TA i,t +0 .1 ∗ (BEi,t − MEi,t)
Book equity is as de￿ned in Davis, Fama and French (2000) and outlined in detail in
Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003). This transformation helps with the values of
total assets that are very small, probably mismeasured and lead to very large values
of NITA. After total assets are adjusted, each of the seven explanatory variables is
winsorized using a 5/95 percentile interval in order to eliminate outliers.
To measure the volatility of a ￿rm￿s stock returns, we use a proxy, centered around
zero rather than the rolling three-month mean, for daily variation of returns computed
22as an annualized three-month rolling sample standard deviation:
SIGMAi,t−1,t−3 =
⎛
⎝252 ∗
1
N − 1
X
k∈{t−1,t−2,t−3}
r
2
i,k
⎞
⎠
1
2
To eliminate cases where few observations are available, SIGMA is coded as missing
if there are fewer than ￿ve non-zero observations over the three months used in the
rolling-window computation. This leads to a loss of about 50,000 observations and
48 bankruptcy events.
To measure distance to default (DD), we use the following formula from Crosbie
and Bohn (2001) and Vassalou and Xing (2004):
DD =
−log(BD/MTA)+0 .06 + RBILL − SIGMA2/2
SIGMA
,
where BD is the book value of debt and MTAis total assets at market value. Follow-
ing the literature, we measure the book value of debt as the book value of short-term
debt, plus one-half the book value of long-term debt. This convention is a simple
w a yt ot a k ea c c o u n to ft h ef a c tt h a tl o n g - t e r md e b tm a yn o tm a t u r eu n t i la f t e rt h e
horizon of the distance to default calculation.
The number 0.06 appears in the formula as an empirical proxy for the equity
premium. Vassalou and Xing (2004) instead estimate the average return on each
stock, but we believe that it is better to use a common expected return for all stocks
than a noisily estimated stock-speci￿c number. Vassalou and Xing also implement
an iterative procedure to estimate the volatility of the ￿rm￿s underlying asset returns.
We instead assume that the ￿rm￿s asset volatility equals its equity volatility, as would
be the case if the market value of the debt is as volatile as the equity. This assump-
tion will understate the distance to default of safe ￿rms, but should be increasingly
accurate as the distance to default shrinks.
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Table 1: Number of Bankruptcies per year 
The table lists the total number of active firms (Column 1) and the total 
number of bankruptcies (Column 2)  for every year of our sample period. 
The number of active firms is computed by averaging over the numbers of 
active firms across all months of the year. The last column shows the 
percentage of bankruptcies. 
Year  Active Firms  Bankruptcies  (%) 
1963 1251  0  0.00 
1964 1297  2  0.15 
1965 1372  2  0.15 
1966 1446  1  0.07 
1967 1542  0  0.00 
1968 1641  0  0.00 
1969 1817  0  0.00 
1970 1951  5  0.26 
1971 2044  4  0.20 
1972 2282  8  0.35 
1973 3531  6  0.17 
1974 3546  18  0.51 
1975 3544  5  0.14 
1976 3570  14  0.39 
1977 3574  12  0.34 
1978 3910  14  0.36 
1979 4041  14  0.35 
1980 4146  26  0.63 
1981 4500  23  0.51 
1982 4687  29  0.62 
1983 4923  50  1.02 
1984 5354  73  1.36 
1985 5360  76  1.42 
1986 5531  95  1.72 
1987 5954  54  0.91 
1988 6026  84  1.39 
1989 5942  74  1.25 
1990 5906  80  1.35 
1991 5918  70  1.18 
1992 6213  45  0.72 
1993 6732  36  0.53 
1994 7408  30  0.40 
1995 7637  43  0.56 
1996 8011  32  0.40 
1997 8302  44  0.53 
1998 8175  49  0.60 
  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
The tables include the following variables (various adjustments are described in the Data Description section): Net Income over 
market value of Total Assets (NIMTA), Total Liabilities over market value of Total Assets (TLMTA),  log of gross excess return over 
value weighted S&P 500 return (EXRET) annualized, i.e. log(1+simple excess return), log of firm￿s market equity over the total 
valuation of S&P 500 (RSIZ), square root of a sum of squared firm stock returns over a three-month period (annualized) (SIGMA), 
stock of cash and short term investments over the market value of Total assets (CASHMTA), and market-to-book value of the firm 
(MB). Market value of total assets was computed by adding market value of firm equity to its total liabilities.   
The first group reports summary statistics for the non-bankruptcy firm-month observations and the second panel for the 
bankruptcy ones. We have a total of 1,281,426 observations, of which 796 are bankruptcy events. In both cases, the panels only 
contain statistics for values where all variables were non-missing (i.e. those observations that were then actually used in 
regressions). 
Non-Bankruptcy group         
   NIMTA  TLMTA  EXRET  RSIZE  SIGMA  CASHMTA  MB 
Mean  0.002 0.441 -0.012  -10.272  0.519  0.079  1.991 
Median  0.007 0.424 -0.011  -10.400  0.442  0.044  1.542 
St. Dev  0.020 0.273 0.108 1.882 0.295  0.087  1.474 
Min  -0.055 0.038 -0.226  -13.291  0.155  0.002  0.400 
Max  0.029 0.918 0.202 -6.712 1.212  0.318  6.041 
Observations:  1280630             
Bankruptcy group           
   NIMTA  TLMTA  EXRET  RSIZE  SIGMA  CASHMTA  MB 
Mean  -0.035 0.762 -0.109  -12.327  0.994  0.043  2.333 
Median  -0.047 0.861 -0.173  -12.881  1.212  0.021  1.018 
St. Dev  0.025 0.209 0.140 1.264 0.299  0.060  2.333 
Observations: 796               
  
Table 3: Logit regressions of default indicator on predictor variables  
This table reports results from logit regressions of the default indicator on predictor variables.  The value of 
the predictor variable is known at the beginning of the month over which bankruptcy is measured.  Net 
income and total liabilities are scaled by accounting and market total assets.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NITA  -16.728       
  (15.47)**       
NIMTA    -33.322  -32.935     
    (19.62)**  (19.91)**     
NIMTAAVG      -42.701  -42.754  -42.768 
      (19.47)**  (19.28)**  (19.27)** 
TLTA  5.612       
  (25.06)**       
TLMTA    4.866 4.827 4.706 4.479 4.790 
    (25.27)** (25.71)** (25.06)** (23.51)** (23.61)** 
EXRET  -3.566 -3.126 -3.111       
  (11.96)** (10.61)** (10.72)**       
EXRETAVG      -10.993  -11.674  -11.529 
      (13.40)**  (14.16)**  (13.95)** 
SIGMA  2.776 2.777 2.749 2.212 2.060 2.497 
  (16.16)** (16.29)** (16.29)** (12.74)** (11.88)** (12.39)** 
RSIZE  -0.123 -0.036 -0.043 0.030  0.038  0.029 
  (3.29)**  (0.98) (1.20) (0.84) (1.04) (0.80) 
CASHMTA       -4.954  -4.826 
       (7.93)**  (7.74)** 
MB       0.124  0.124 
       (7.73)**  (7.76)** 
DD        0.094 
        ( 4 . 7 9 ) * *  
SIGMAMISS      1.272 1.095 1.110 1.165 
      (6.22)** (5.31)** (5.38)** (5.64)** 
Constant  -15.158 -13.586 -13.611 -12.618 -12.234 -13.160 
  (36.58)** (34.88)** (35.11)** (32.60)** (31.02)** (29.60)** 
Observations  1197376 1264108 1281426 1281426 1281426 1281426 
No. of 
bankruptcies  737 762   796 796 796 796 
Pseudo  R  squared  0.268 0.273 0.268 0.282 0.293 0.295 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4: Logit regressions on lagged best-model variables 
The table below takes our best variables and tests their predictive power as we lag them by 6, 12, 24, and 36 months. Panel A 
uses all the available observations for each of the 5 regressions. Panel B restricts the available observations to the minimum 
set so that each regressions has the same number of observations. 
Panel A  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Months lagged by:  0  6  12  24  36 
NIMTAAVG  -42.768 -34.854 -25.811 -15.958  -9.931 
  (19.27)** (18.01)** (12.81)**  (6.87)**  (3.66)** 
TLMTA  4.790 2.736 2.080 1.374 1.293 
  (23.61)** (17.85)** (13.50)**  (8.08)**  (6.83)** 
EXRETAVG  -11.529 -10.471 -10.421  -6.505  -5.816 
  (13.95)** (13.14)** (12.33)**  (6.85)**  (5.45)** 
SIGMA  2.497 1.289 1.042 0.768 0.639 
  (12.39)**  (8.20)** (6.56)** (4.41)** (3.26)** 
RSIZE  0.029 -0.057 -0.057 -0.093 -0.097 
  (0.80) (1.97)* (2.08)*  (3.29)**  (3.26)** 
CASHMTA  -4.826 -6.064 -4.738 -3.019 -2.843 
  (7.74)**  (10.36)**  (8.70)** (5.73)** (4.93)** 
MB  0.124 0.109 0.112 0.096 0.123 
  (7.76)** (6.39)** (5.90)** (4.13)** (4.65)** 
DD  0.094 0.020 0.001 -0.019  -0.017 
  (4.79)**  (1.31) (0.10) (1.34) (1.13) 
SIGMAMISS  1.165  0.071 -0.072 -0.272 -1.541 
  (5.64)**  (0.29) (0.26) (0.79) (2.16)* 
Constant  -13.160  -10.624  -9.784 -9.266 -9.201 
  (29.60)** (30.31)** (29.05)** (26.59)** (24.82)** 
Observations  1281426 1193002 1108671  954603  822626 
No. of bankruptcies  796   926  865  729  605 
Pseudo  R  squared  0.295 0.172 0.112 0.052 0.037 
Panel B  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NIMTAAVG  -40.892 -36.679 -25.003 -15.229 -10.082 
  (14.04)**  (13.21)**  (8.93)** (5.17)** (3.23)** 
TLMTA  6.023 4.292 3.455 2.266 1.449 
  (17.72)** (16.28)** (14.15)** (10.15)**  (6.68)** 
EXRETAVG  -10.922 -9.842 -11.118 -7.666  -6.856 
  (10.08)**  (8.66)** (9.53)** (6.34)** (5.60)** 
SIGMA  2.893 1.455 1.199 0.922 0.685 
  (10.41)**  (6.46)** (5.51)** (4.24)** (3.07)** 
RSIZE  0.075 -0.028 -0.044 -0.076 -0.083 
  (1.64) (0.70) (1.19) (2.21)*  (2.47)* 
CASHMTA  -4.062 -4.756 -4.282 -2.638 -2.561 
  (4.85)** (5.70)** (5.52)** (3.95)** (3.98)** 
MB  0.112 0.113 0.091 0.105 0.119 
  (5.62)** (5.04)** (3.66)** (3.72)** (3.94)** 
DD  0.100 0.029 0.004 -0.008  -0.014 
  (3.62)**  (1.34) (0.21) (0.46) (0.87) 
SIGMAMISS  0.838 -0.631 -0.308 -0.419 -1.139 
  (2.44)* (1.22) (0.67) (0.82) (1.59) 
Constant  -13.926 -11.845 -10.897 -10.025  -9.378 
  (23.80)** (24.27)** (23.86)** (23.41)** (22.47)** 
Observations  773159 773159 773159 773159 773159 
No.  of  bankruptcies  470 470 470 470 470 
Pseudo  R  squared  0.321 0.209 0.147 0.068 0.038 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
Table 5: Logit regressions with macro variables 
The regressions below include two macro variables. Regression in column 1 includes default 
yield spread (DFY), the spread between the yields on BAA and AAA rated debt. Regression 
in column two includes term spread (TMS), the difference between yields on a 10-year 
government bond and 6-month T-Bill. Both regressions include interactions of these two 
variables with relative size (RSIZE) and leverage (TLMTA). 
   (1)  (2) 
NIMTAAVG  -42.229 -42.407 
  (18.95)** (19.07)** 
TLMTA  6.312 5.675 
  (14.03)** (13.53)** 
TLMTA*DFY  -175.289  
  (5.09)**  
TLMTA*TMS   -63.873 
   (3.36)** 
EXRETAVG  -11.454 -11.719 
  (13.90)** (14.12)** 
SIGMA  2.184 2.062 
  (12.72)** (11.87)** 
RSIZE  0.164 0.048 
  (2.13)* (0.84) 
RSIZE*DFY  -13.020  
  (2.25)*  
RSIZE*TMS   -0.252 
   (0.10) 
CASHMTA  -4.667 -4.893 
  (7.46)** (7.81)** 
MB  0.127 0.121 
  (7.94)** (7.58)** 
SIGMAMISS  0.971 1.093 
  (4.72)** (5.30)** 
DFY  37.025  
  (0.51)  
TMS   53.101 
   (1.60) 
Constant  -12.831 -13.134 
 (13.80)**  (18.18)** 
Observations 1243098  1243098 
No. of bankruptcies  792  792 
Pseudo R squared  0.299  0.294 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Figure 1 The graph shows the percentage of active firms (where the number of firms in a year is taken as the average over the year) 
that were bankrupt in any given year over the period 1963-1998.  
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Figure 2 The graph above shows the distribution of the company￿s Net Income over market-adjusted Total Assets (the sum of 
market value of equity and book value of Total Liabilities) for the firm-month when the firm was in bankruptcy (left) and all others 
(right). The mass points in either graph represent the effect of winsorization (i.e. the resulting mass points). The variable has also been 
lagged to ensure that the information was the latest publicly available in the month with which it is associated. 0
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Figure 3 The graph above shows the distribution of the company￿s Total Liabilities over market-adjusted Total Assets (the sum of 
market value of equity and book value of Total Liabilities) for the firm-month when the firm was in bankruptcy (left) and all others 
(right). The mass points in either graph represent the effect of winsorization (i.e. the resulting mass points). The variable has also been 
lagged to ensure that the information was the latest publicly available in the month with which it is associated. 
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Figure 4 The graph above shows the distribution of the log gross excess monthly return on company stock over the value-weighted 
S&P500 Index (EXRET) for the firm-month when the firm was in bankruptcy (left) and all others (right). It was constructed as the log 
of a gross return based on the simple difference between the return on the company stock and return on the index in a given month. 
The mass points in either graph represent the effect of winsorization (i.e. the resulting mass points). The variable has also been lagged 
to ensure that the information was the latest publicly available in the month with which it is associated.  0
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Figure 5 The graph above shows the distribution of the log of the ratio of company￿s market equity and S&P 500 index total market 
valuation (RSIZ) for the firm-month when the firm was in bankruptcy (left) and all others (right). The mass points in either graph 
represent the effect of winsorization (i.e. the resulting mass points). The variable has also been lagged to ensure that the information 
was the latest publicly available in the month with which it is associated. 
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Figure 6 The graph above shows the distribution of the estimate of daily return variations (annualized) -- constructed by summing 
over squared daily returns in any given month and diving by the number of observations less 1 -- for the firm-month when the firm 
was in bankruptcy (left) and all others (right). The mass points in either graph represent the effect of winsorization (i.e. the resulting 
mass points). The variable has also been lagged to ensure that the information was the latest publicly available in the month with 
which it is associated. 0
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Figure 7 The graph above shows the distribution of the company￿s Cash and Cash equivalent securities over Total Assets (adjusted 
as described in the Data section) for the firm-month when the firm was in bankruptcy (left) and all others (right). The mass points in 
either graph represent the effect of winsorization (i.e. the resulting mass points). The variable has also been lagged to ensure that the 
information was the latest publicly available in the month with which it is associated. 
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Figure 8 The graph above shows the distribution of the company￿s Market-to-Book value (adjusted as described in the Data 
section) for the firm-month when the firm was in bankruptcy (left) and all others (right). The mass points in either graph represent the 
effect of winsorization (i.e. the resulting mass points). The variable has also been lagged to ensure that the information was the latest 
publicly available in the month with which it is associated.  
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Figure 9 The graph above represents the percentage of aggregate bankruptcies as predicted by our model and the actual 
bankruptcies that occurred in that year. To get the predicted percentage of bankruptcies, we average over the predicted probability 
(based on our model) of all active firms in a given month.   
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Figure 10 The graph above shows the deviation of the year dummy coefficients from their sample mean. The coefficient estimates 
are from the regression that included only dummies. The number of observations is equal to that in our best model regression. The 
dotted line shows a 2 standard deviation confidence interval around zero for each coefficient value.  
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Figure 11 The graph above shows the deviation of the year dummy coefficients from their sample mean. The coefficient 
estimates are from our best fitting regression. The dotted line shows a 2 standard deviation confidence interval around zero for each 
coefficient value.  Loadings on FF factors
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Figure 12 The graph above shows the loadings (betas) on Fama-French factors from the regressions of bankruptcy portfolios on the 
three factors (RM, HML, SMB).  
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Figure 13 The graph shows alphas from various regressions: regression on a constant (Mean return), three-factor regression (FF 
alpha) and the CAPM regression (CAPM alpha). 